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DRUG VIOLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVISIONS: MEXICO’S 2008 CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE REFORM AND THE FORMATION 
OF RULE OF LAW 
INTRODUCTION 
 [C]omo trabajadores de la información queremos que nos expliquen 
qué es lo que quieren de nosotros, qué es lo que pretenden que publi-
quemos o dejemos de publicar, para saber a qué atenernos. Ustedes son, 
en estos momentos, las autoridades de facto en esta ciudad, porque los 
mandos instituidos legalmente no han podido hacer nada para impedir 
que nuestros compañeros sigan cayendo, a pesar de que reiteradamente 
se los hemos exigido. Es por ello que, frente a esta realidad inobjetable, 
nos dirigimos a ustedes para preguntarles, porque lo menos que quere-
mos es que otro más de nuestros colegas vuelva a ser víctima de sus 
disparos.1 
n September 16, 2010, a group of hit men open fired on a car car-
rying Luis Carlos Santiago, a twenty-one year old photojournalist 
for the Chihuahuan newspaper El Diario.2 Santiago died immediately, 
becoming yet another casualty of the ongoing drug violence in Mexico 
that claimed more than 22,000 lives between 2006 and 2010.3 Following 
                                                                                                             
 1. Editorial, ¿Qué quieren de nosotros? [What Do You Want from Us?], EL DIARIO 
(Sept. 18, 2010), 
http://www.diario.com.mx/notas.php?f=2010/09/18&id=6b124801376ce134c7d6ce2c7fb
8fe2f# (Mex.). 
As journalists we want you to explain what it is you want from us, what you 
will let us publish, and what you will not let us publish, so we can know what 
to expect. You are, in these moments, the de facto authorities in this city, be-
cause the efforts of the legal system cannot stop our partners from falling, re-
gardless of our repeated requests. That is why, faced with this undeniable reali-
ty, we come to you, to prevent yet another one of our colleagues from becom-
ing a victim of your bullets. 
Id. 
 2. Rubén Villalpando & Gustavo Castillo, El auto en que fue asesinado fotógrafo en 
Juárez era de visitador de la CEDH [The Car in Juárez in which the Photographer was 
Murdered Belonged to the Inspector for the CEDH], LA JORNADA (Mexico City), Sept. 
18, 2010, at 7; Ataca grupo armado a dos fotógrafos de ‘El Diario’ de Juárez; muere uno 
[Armed Group Attacks Two Photographers from ‘El Diario’ of Juárez; One Dies], LA 
JORNADA EN LÍNEA), Sept. 16, 2010, 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/ultimas/2010/09/16/ejecutan-a-reportero-graphico-de-el-
diario-de-juarez (Mex.). 
 3. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-837, MÉRIDA INITIATIVE: THE 
U.S. HAS PROVIDED COUNTERNARCOTICS AND ANTICRIME SUPPORT BUT NEEDS BETTER 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES 1 (2010) [hereinafter GAO REPORT]. 
O
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Santiago’s funeral, El Diario published an emotional plea on September 
18 asking for a truce between organized crime leaders and the media (see 
above).4 Santiago’s death represents a small example of the brutal vio-
lence associated with Mexico’s seemingly endless drug war, which some 
have begun to consider “civil war.”5 
While intermittent drug violence has existed in Mexico for quite some 
time, since 2006 violent acts have “passed the tipping point to become a 
genuine threat to national security and democratic governance.”6 This 
extreme rise in drug related violence is paired with an ineffective “po-
lice-justice-regulatory system,”7 creating strong public distrust of law 
enforcement throughout Mexico.8 As a direct result of Mexico’s ineffec-
tive criminal justice system, impunity rates for all reported crimes have 
risen to approximately ninety-eight percent.9 Accordingly, in 2008, Pres-
ident Felipe Calderon passed a series of constitutional amendments 
aimed at reforming the Mexican criminal justice system through the im-
plementation of accusatorial and oral criminal proceedings, similar to 
those employed in the United States.10 Ideally, these amendments would 
create a more transparent and efficient criminal justice system, capable 
of establishing “rule of law.”11 However, reform implementation has 
been slow moving.12 Moreover, while the reform provides for a restruc-
turing of the criminal system generally, it retains multiple special provi-
sions for suspects accused of participating in organized crime.13 These 
                                                                                                             
 4. ¿Qué quieren de nosotros?, supra note 1. 
 5. Ronald F. Wright, Mexican Drug Violence and Adversarial Experiments, 35 N.C. 
J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 363, 363 (2010). 
 6. John Bailey, Combating Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking in Mexico: What 
are Mexican and U.S. Strategies? Are They Working?, in SHARED RESPONSIBILITY: U.S.-
MEXICO POLICY OPTIONS FOR CONFRONTING ORGANIZED CRIME 327, 327–28 (Eric L. 
Olson et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter SHARED RESPONSIBILITY]. 
 7. Id. at 327. 
 8. Id. 
 9. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 111TH CONG. 2D SESS., COMMON ENEMY, 
COMMON STRUGGLE: PROGRESS IN U.S.-MEXICAN EFFORTS TO DEFEAT ORGANIZED CRIME 
AND DRUG TRAFFICKING, 5 (Comm. Print 2010) (“In other words, about 98% of perpetra-
tors have not been brought to justice.”). 
 10. See Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.][Constitution], 
as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DO], 18 de Junio de 2008 (Mex.). 
 11. Steven E. Hendrix, The Mérida Initiative for Mexico and Central America: The 
New Paradigm for Security Cooperation, Attacking Organized Crime, Corruption and 
Violence, 5 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 107, 111 (2008). 
 12. Bailey, supra note 6, at 328. 
 13. C.P. arts. 16, 18 (Mex.). 
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exceptions preserve many of the systemic flaws that have historically 
undermined rule of law in Mexico.14 
This Note argues that in order to establish an effective rule of law, 
Mexico must significantly increase public confidence in its criminal jus-
tice system through the actual implementation of a transparent criminal 
justice system that respects individual liberties. This must be accom-
plished through the formation of an independent and transparent judici-
ary and a well-respected and empowered defense bar within an accusato-
rial procedural framework. While aspects of the 2008 constitutional 
amendments provide a foundation for this transition, the amendments 
also include provisions that limit the level of due process afforded to 
suspects involved in organized crime. Accordingly, without an efficient 
and successful implementation of the provisions that seek to establish an 
accusatory criminal justice system, the 2008 amendments threaten to fur-
ther decrease rule of law in Mexico. Part I of this Note will provide a 
background of Mexico’s criminal justice system prior to 2008. Part II 
will provide an analysis of the relevant 2008 amendments. Part III will 
discuss the implementation of the amendments and their effect on rule of 
law. 
I. A MIXED SYSTEM 
Generally speaking, the foundations of the Mexican criminal justice 
system were built upon the civil law traditions of Europe, particularly 
those of Spain.15 These civil law traditions focused on an inquisitorial 
model16 of criminal procedure that relied on an instructional judge to lead 
                                                                                                             
 14. See Jorge Rivero Evia, ¿Aseguramiento o Garantismo? El Derecho Penal del 
Enemigo en la Constitución Mexicana [Assuarance or Guarentee? Criminal Law and the 
Enemy in the Mexican Constituion], 27 REVISTA DEL INSTITUTO DE LA JUDICATURA 
FEDERAL 253 (2009) (arguing the 2008 constitutional amendments operate in a manner in 
which two systems are created, one for “citizens” and another for “enemies.” Enemies are 
categorized by the constitution as those suspected of the most violent crimes or participa-
tion in organized crime. Those categorized as “enemy” suspects have significantly less-
ened human rights protections compared to “citizens”). 
 15. David A. Shirk, Justice Reform in Mexico: Change and Challenges in the Judicial 
Sector, in SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 6, at 212–14. 
 16. There are three key aspects that highlight the difference between adversarial and 
inquisitorial justice systems: 
1.  inquisitorial systems have a far greater integration of the roles of the inves-
tigators, prosecutors and decision-makers than adversarial systems do; 
2.  the function of an inquisitorial system at all stages is to inquire into the truth 
of an allegation whereas the function of an adversarial criminal trial is to test 
whether the prosecutor can prove the specific allegation it has made; and 
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the investigation and to make determinations of guilt or innocence.17 
However, following the Mexican Revolution, the 1917 Constituent Con-
gress—the authors of the modern Mexican Constitution—strongly criti-
cized the inquisitorial method for creating corrupt and arbitrary ver-
dicts.18 Accordingly, the Constitution of 1917 abandoned many aspects 
of the traditional inquisitorial system and adopted a system more remi-
niscent of accusatorial models.19 Interestingly, however, the majority of 
these changes never took form20 and the federal government did not 
adopt a new criminal code until 1931.21 This new criminal code was ex-
traordinary in application because of its lack of adherence to both the 
1917 Constitution and traditional notions of inquisitorial or accusatory 
procedure.22 Instead, the system employed inquisitorial procedures dur-
ing the investigative stage, similar to those in existence prior to the im-
plementation of the 1917 Constitution, with accusatorial procedures dur-
ing final court proceedings, which served only symbolic significance.23 
This mixed procedural system blurred the division between judge and 
prosecutor, thereby requiring the accused to argue his case in front of an 
opposing party rather than a neutral and detached magistrate.24 With lim-
ited exceptions, this system of criminal procedure remains in effect 
                                                                                                             
3. inquisitorial system decision-makers tend to rely on information in a court 
file assembled without the significant limits imposed by evidentiary rules. 
David M. Paciocco, Understanding the Accusatorial System, 14 CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 307,  
308 (2010). 
 17. Shirk, supra note 15, at 214. 
 18. Diario de los Debates del Congreso Constituyente [Record of the Constitutional 
Congressional Debates], No. 12, at 263, 1 de Diciembre de 1916 (Mex.). In particular, the 
Congress called for a reform that would limit the excessive power of state judges, which 
the Congress viewed as a threat to justice and individual rights. Id. With respect to crimi-
nal justice, the Congress stated that while the 1857 Constitution included numerous pro-
cedural safeguards for the accused, in practice these safeguards were ignored leaving 
defendants subject to the “arbitrary and despotic discretion of the judge and even his 
secretary and clerks.” Id. 
 19. Carlos Rios Espinoza, Redesigning Mexico’s Criminal Procedure: The State’s 
Turning Point, 15 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 53, 56 (2008). 
 20. Espinoza, supra note 19, at 56. 
 21. Shirk, supra note 15, at 214. This new code was established under the Código 
Federal de Procedimientos Penales (Federal Code of Criminal Procedure) (“FCCP”). Id. 
 22. Espinoza, supra note 19, at 56–57. 
 23. Id. The accusatorial aspects of the trial phase of the criminal justice system, post 
1931, lacked real significance because in most circumstances, all arguments would have 
already been made and decided upon during the investigative stage. Id. at 60. For more 
information, see infra Part I. 
 24. Espinoza, supra note 19, at 57. 
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throughout Mexico, where inquisitorial procedures continue to limit the 
due process rights of defendants.25 
What sets Mexico’s procedural system apart from the majority of mod-
ern legal systems is the almost plenary power and expansive role of the 
public prosecutor.26 Throughout the investigative process, the public 
prosecutor enjoys an almost unfettered freedom to collect and admit into 
trial any evidence he or she wishes.27 Additionally, the public prosecutor 
often works unopposed by the defense bar during court proceedings, add-
ing to the significant influence he or she has over convictions.28 In fact, 
the system is such that “the prosecution evidence presented to the court 
has, by legal mandate, greater validity than the defense evidence so long 
as the prosecutors have complied with the certain formalities.”29 
To better understand the role of the public prosecutor, an understand-
ing of Mexican criminal procedure is necessary. Generally, and with lim-
ited exceptions, the procedural system is broken down into five phases: 
(1) averiguación previa (preliminary inquiry); (2) preinstrucción (in-
dictment); (3) instucción (evidentiary phase); (4) juicio (trial); and (5) 
sentencia (sentencing).30 
A. Averiguación Previa 
After a crime has been reported, the public prosecutor will begin a pre-
liminary investigation known as the averiguación previa.31 During the 
preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor, with the assistance of 
the police, will work to compile sufficient evidence to establish the cor-
pus delicti.32 During the investigative process, the prosecution collects 
                                                                                                             
 25. Id. 
 26. Wright, supra note 5, at 371–72. 
 27. Id. at 374. 
 28. See generally David Brennan, Mexico’s Twin Challenges: Reforming its Criminal 
Justice System and Combating Drug-Cartel Violence, 51 ORANGE COUNTY L. 38, 40 
(2009) (describing the deficiencies in the Mexican criminal justice system caused by the 
deference given to the discretion of the prosecutor, and the lack of an empowered defense 
bar). 
 29. Miguel Sarré & Jan Perlin, Mexico, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE 
STUDY 351, 352 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007). Evidence presented by the prosecu-
tor is considered more credible than evidence presented by the defense due to a rebuttable 
presumption that the prosecutor objectively gathered evidence while operating in good 
faith. Id. at 387. This presumption, however, is often considered questionable because 
prosecutors frequently operate under a quota for court remittals. Id. 
 30. Shirk, supra note 15, at 220; Espinoza, supra note 19, at 58. 
 31. Shirk, supra note 15, at 220. 
 32. Espinoza, supra note 19, at 59. Corpus delicti is sufficient evidence to suggest a 
crime has actually been committed. Id. 
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evidence without supervision, acting both as the investigative authority 
and the magistrate.33 This is due to an automatic rebuttable presumption 
that the prosecution’s investigation is conducted in good faith and that 
the fruits of its investigation are credible and constitutionally valid.34 
This presumption creates a nontransparent investigative stage, open to 
abuse and corruption. The potential for abuse during the preliminary in-
vestigation has led many critics to “charge that the power and autonomy 
of the public prosecutor at this stage . . . is one of the major contributors 
to the abuses found in the traditional Mexican system, including forced 
confessions and mishandling of evidence.”35 
During the preliminary investigation, the Mexican Supreme Court “has 
authorized the public prosecutor to issue orders to appear before him/her 
(orden de presentación)” for both suspects and witnesses.36 While not 
related to the power to arrest, failure to appear will result in an arrest 
warrant.37 Thus, in the eyes of the public, an order to appear operates 
identically to an arrest warrant.38 Following the order to appear, the pros-
ecutor may petition a judge to place the suspect in arraigo (preventative 
detention).39 Arraigo, which occurs before any criminal charges are initi-
ated, is often used as a mechanism of interrogation under the “logic of 
‘detain first and investigate later.’”40 Detention under arraigo can range 
between house arrest41 and solitary confinement lasting up to eighty 
days.42 
B. Preinstrucción 
Once the public prosecutor has gathered sufficient evidence to estab-
lish corpus delicti, he or she will compile the evidence against the sus-
pect in a written dossier to be presented to the judge.43 Because the pros-
                                                                                                             
 33. Sarré & Perlin, supra note 29, at 352. 
 34. Id. at 387. 
 35. Shirk, supra note 15, at 220. 
 36. Sarré & Perlin, supra note 29, at 355. 
 37. Id. at 356. 
 38. See id. 
 39. Id. at 387. 
 40. Stephanie Erin Brewer, Structural Human Rights Violations: The True Face of 
Mexico’s War on Crime, AM. U. HUM. RTS. BRIEF, Winter 2009, at 10. 
 41. Sarré & Perlin, supra note 29, at 356. 
 42. Shirk, supra note 15, at 232; C.P. art. 16 (Mex.). Prior to 2006, arraigo was 
common practice throughout Mexico. Brewer, supra note 40, at 10. However, in 2006 the 
Supreme Court of Mexico ruled that the procedure was unconstitutional. Id. Article 16 of 
the 2008 constitutional amendments overruled the 2006 decision by including a provision 
that explicitly makes arraigo procedures constitutional. Shirk, supra note 15, at 232. 
 43. Espinoza, supra note 19, at 59. 
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ecutor is responsible for decisions of admissibility, all evidence compiled 
in the dossier is considered to be credible and admissible and is only ju-
dicially reviewable upon appeal.44 The prosecutor will also determine 
whether the suspect will be released on bail or detained during trial.45 If 
the suspect is detained, as in the majority of circumstances,46 the prose-
cutor has forty-eight hours to remit the suspect to the custody of the 
court.47 During these forty-eight hours, the prosecutor may interrogate 
the suspect to compile any remaining evidence.48 While the suspect must 
be alerted of his right to counsel, access to counsel or family members is 
often denied during the initial forty-eight hour phase under Mexico’s 
interpretation of the “principio de imediatez” (“procedural immediacy 
principle”).49 Following the forty-eight hour period, the suspect will be 
remanded to the court. The court will then examine the evidence gath-
ered by the prosecutor to determine whether there is sufficient evidence 
to formally charge the suspect.50 
Before the suspect is formally indicted, the court will conduct a hear-
ing called the plazo constitucional (constitutional term) at which time the 
judge will advise the suspect of his rights, consider the legality of the 
arrest, appoint defense counsel, and allow the suspect to make a state-
ment.51 It is important to note, however, that because there is no “‘fruits 
of the poisonous tree doctrine’ . . . evidence obtained directly as a result 
                                                                                                             
 44. Sarré & Perlin, supra note 29, at 372. 
 45. Id. at 372–73. 
 46. Shirk, supra note 15, at 221 n.46. 
 47. Id. at 373. Determinations of bail or pre-trial detention are left almost exclusively 
to secondary legislation, which links the determinations to the gravity of the crime for 
which the suspect has been accused. Id. 
 48. Id. at 364–69. 
 49. Id. at 365. The principle of procedural immediacy, as understood throughout Lat-
in America, states that testimony presented in front of a judge holds greater weight than 
that given to police or prosecutors. Rep. on the Situation of Human Rights in Mexico, 
Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 7/100, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.100, doc. 7, rev. 1, ¶ 313 
(1998) [hereinafter Human Rights in Mexico], available at 
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Mexico98en/chapter-4.htm. The Mexican judiciary, 
however, has interpreted the principle to create “a presumption that the first or ‘most 
immediate’ statement of the defendant after arrest should be given the greatest credibil-
ity.” Joseph R. Crowley Program & Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez Human Rights Center, 
Special Report, Presumed Guilty?: Criminal Justice and Human Rights in Mexico, 24 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 801, 828 (2001) [hereinafter Presumed Guilty]. In particular, state-
ments made without preparation or assistance of counsel will be found the most persua-
sive at trial. Sarré & Perlin, supra note 29, at 365 n.50. Accordingly, the need to gather 
what is considered to be the most credible form of evidence will justify the denial of 
counsel during these initial phases of the investigation. See id. at 365. 
 50. Espinoza, supra note 19, at 59. 
 51. Sarré & Perlin, supra note 29, at 377. 
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of a search where the legal formalities are not complied with will be ex-
cluded from the trial, but not necessarily the evidence gathered as an in-
direct product of the illegal search.”52 Accordingly, even in the event of 
an illegal search or arrest, it is probable that the criminal proceedings 
will still proceed. Once charges are filed, the chance of a guilty verdict is 
significant considering the substantial weight of the prosecution’s evi-
dence, and the defense’s relatively limited ability to rebut during the pre-
instruction phase.53 
C. Instucción 
An instucción (evidentiary stage) follows the formal indictment of the 
suspect.54 During this stage, the judge or his staff will review the dossier 
provided by the prosecution and will hear testimony from witnesses. The 
defense is also able to present exculpatory evidence and testimony to the 
judge as well.55 While opportunities exist for oral presentation of evi-
dence, in most cases oral testimony will be presented only to the judge’s 
legal secretary or staff rather than directly to the judge.56 Further, the 
prosecution is not required to present their witnesses for cross-
examination; therefore the defense rarely has the opportunity to confront 
the evidence presented against him or her.57 Finally, because of the dis-
jointed and bureaucratic nature of the evidentiary proceedings, which can 
take years to conclude, suspects are often held in preventative detention 
for years at a time without receiving a final verdict.58 
D. Juicio and Sentencia 
The juicio (trial) stage of criminal proceedings is a symbolic formality 
dating back to the accusatorial system suggested by the 1917 constitu-
tion.59 During the trial, the prosecution and the defense are allowed to 
                                                                                                             
 52. Id. at 360. In the United States’ legal system, the “fruits of the poisonous tree” 
doctrine provides that all evidence gathered as a result of an illegal search or seizure must 
be excluded. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939); Silverthorne Lum-
ber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). 
 53. See Shirk, supra note 15, at 210 (stating that for cases that go to trial, the convic-
tion rate in Mexico is approximately 85%). 
 54. Wright, supra note 5, at 370–71. 
 55. Espinoza, supra note 19, at 60. 
 56. Sarré & Perlin, supra note 29, at 381. 
 57. Espinoza, supra note 19, at 60. 
 58. Sarré & Perlin, supra note 29, at 377. In 2007, 40% of Mexico’s inmate popula-
tion consisted of defendants who had not received sentences. EMILY EDMONDS-POLI & 
DAVID A. SHIRK, CONTEMPORARY MEXICAN POLITICS 308–09 (2009). 
 59. See Espinoza, supra note 19, at 56, 60 (The 1917 constitution addressed issues of 
“lack of judicial independence, [] opacity and lack of publicity in judicial activities, and 
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present oral arguments.60 These arguments, however, are rarely persua-
sive because they almost never occur in the presence of the judge and all 
arguments will have already been adjudicated and presented in the 
court’s dossier.61 At the conclusion of the arguments, a verdict and sen-
tence will be announced, thus terminating the criminal proceedings.62 
Many commentators and human rights groups have cited these proce-
dures as a primary cause for the current disarray of the country’s criminal 
justice system.63 A system without adequate procedural checks, in which 
the majority of power lies in the hands of a select few individuals, 
“leaves prosecutors (and police, judges, customs officials, and prison 
administrators) susceptible to bribery and corruption.”64 Corrupt practic-
                                                                                                             
human rights violations.” Today, however, hearings are considered mere formalities sep-
arate from these fundamental concerns.). 
 60. Id. at 60. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Gonzalo Reyes Salas, Guidelines to Reform Mexican Criminal Procedure, 15 
SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 83, 87–89 (2008) (arguing for a division of the material functions 
of the public prosecutor’s office); Amnesty Int’l, Mexico: Injustice and Impunity: Mexi-
co’s Flawed Criminal Justice System, at 2, AI Index AMR 41/001/2007 (Feb. 2007) 
[hereinafter Injustice and Impunity], available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR41/001/2007/en/910c403f-d3c5-11dd-
8743-d305bea2b2c7/amr410012007en.pdf (providing case studies to evidence issues 
within the criminal justice system); see also Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 
(1971) (describing the dangers associated with allowing the prosecutor to act as a magis-
trate). 
 64. Wright, supra note 5, at 373. In 2005, Lydia Cacho was arrested at the women’s 
shelter she runs in Cancun, Quintana Roo, by judicial police from the public prosecutor’s 
office in the state of Puebla. Injustice and Impunity, supra note 63, at 3. A journalist and 
women’s rights activist, Cacho was arrested for allegedly defaming the reputation of a 
powerful executive from the state Puebla. Id. While under the custody of her arresting 
officers, Cacho reported being “at risk of sexual assault and enforced disappearance.” Id. 
Two months after the arrest, “audiotapes were leaked to the media . . . [which] reportedly 
contained a telephone conversation in which the Governor of Puebla State agreed to or-
ganize the detention of Lydia Cacho on behalf of the business man” without probable 
cause. Id. 
  In May 2009, Mexican federal police detained twenty-seven public officials in the 
state of Michoacán, including several judges, ten mayors, the state prosecutor, and state 
police officers. Tracy Wilkinson, 10 Mayors, and Other Officials Detained, L.A. TIMES 
(May 27, 2009), http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-mexico-
mayors27-2009may27,0,1829460.story. The state officials were suspected of maintaining 
ties with powerful drug cartels, including accepting thousands of dollars worth of bribes 
from the La Familia cartel, which operates out of the State of Michoacán and is suspected 
infiltrating local governments. Ken Ellingwood & Tracy Wilkinson, Corruption Sweep in 
Mexico’s Michoacán Unravels in the Courts, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2010), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/dec/12/world/la-fg-mexico-michoacan-20101212. How-
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es and general inefficiencies have led to a strong public distrust of the 
criminal justice system.65 The expansive power of the public prosecutor 
has led to the “public belief that almost all of its actions [are] virtually 
fool proof in trial.”66 According to a public poll conducted in March 
2010, when asked how dangerous it would be to help the police in their 
city, seventy-two percent of Mexicans responded that it would be some-
what to very dangerous;67 when asked about confidence in the police, 
more than one-third of Mexicans stated that they had little to no confi-
dence in the police as an institution.68 As a result of public distrust in the 
criminal justice system, Mexican citizens are often reluctant to turn to the 
courts, thereby furthering impunity for perpetrators and incentivizing 
corrupt practices.69 Accordingly, public distrust and institutional corrup-
tion pose a direct threat to rule of law in Mexico.70 
II. 2008 AMENDMENTS 
Mexico has a long history of drug related activity dating back to boot-
legging in the early 1900s.71 Over the past hundred years, drug traffick-
ing has continued to grow throughout Mexico, and by 1991 Mexican 
drug trafficking organizations were reportedly responsible for smuggling 
300–350 tons of cocaine per year and approximately one-third of all her-
oin and marijuana into the United States.72 The destabilization of the Co-
lumbian drug cartels in the 1990s further fueled the Mexican drug traf-
ficking organizations’ rise to power, as trafficking routes shifted away 
                                                                                                             
ever, by December 2010, all but one of the suspects were released, possibly due to the 
public prosecutor’s unwillingness or incompetence in seeking convictions. Id. 
 65. Wright, supra note 5, at 373. 
 66. Salas, supra note 63, at 87. 
 67. Percepción Ciudadana Sobre la Seguridad en México [Citizen’s Perception of 
Security in Mexico], CONSULTA MITOFSKY (Apr. 14, 2010), 
http://www.consulta.mx/Estudio.aspx?Estudio=seguridad-mexico-mucd. 
 68. Id. 
 69. EDMONDS-POLI & SHIRK, supra note 58, at 308. (“[C]orruption makes it possible 
for some to live outside the scope of the law. Once this precedent is set, everyone has an 
incentive to bypass or simply ignore the law, making it essentially irrelevant and society 
chaotic.”). 
 70. See Robert H. Tembeckjian, Point of View: Judicial Reform and the Test of Time, 
N.Y. ST. B. J., June 2010, at 43 (“Public confidence in the independence, integrity, impar-
tiality and high standards of the judiciary . . . is essential to the rule of law.”). 
 71. Luis Astorga & David A. Shirk, Drug Trafficking Organizations and Counter-
Drug Strategies in the U.S.-Mexican Context in SHARED RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 6, at 
32–33 (Eric L. Olson et al. eds., 2010). (During the first half of the twentieth century, 
Mexican organized crime and smuggling rings created the foundation for drug trafficking 
as they smuggled marijuana, opiates, and alcohol into the United States.). 
 72. Id. at 33. 
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from the Caribbean and into Central America and Mexico.73 Up until the 
past ten years, however, Mexico’s drug trafficking organizations operat-
ed with relatively little violence due in part to a “working relationship” 
that existed between the drug trafficking organizations and the Institu-
tional Revolutionary Party (“PRI”), which maintained a one party system 
in Mexico for over seventy years.74 During this period, drug trafficking 
organizations were said to have operated with little resistance from the 
Mexican government.75 Accordingly, this “‘live and let live’ approach . . 
. kept relative public peace and a semblance of law and order through the 
containment (rather than the destruction) of drug syndicates.”76 
However, following the presidential victory of the rightwing National 
Action Party (“PAN”) in 2000, and particularly President Filipe Calde-
ron’s victory in 2006, Mexico’s attitude toward drug trafficking organi-
zations has changed significantly.77 Under increased political pressure 
from both Mexico and the United States, tens of thousands of Mexican 
troops were deployed across Mexico in an attempt to disrupt trafficking 
activity.78 Faced with fewer trafficking routes, Mexico’s drug organiza-
tions began to engage in a brutal turf war, with frequent attacks on the 
Mexican Army, Federal Police, rival drug trafficking organizations, and 
the public.79 Since President Calderon’s election in 2006, drug violence 
                                                                                                             
 73. Benjamin Kai Miller, Fueling Violence along the Southwest Border: What More 
Can be Done to Protect the Citizens of the United States and Mexico from Firearms Traf-
ficking, 32 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 163, 174–75 (2009). Throughout the 1970s and 80s, the 
majority of cocaine in the United States was supplied by the Columbian Medellín and 
Calí cartels, which would smuggle drugs into the United States via the Gulf of Mexico. 
EDMONDS-POLI & SHIRK, supra note 58, at 311. However, after the death of cartel leader 
Pablo Escobar, and significant US interdiction efforts in the Gulf, power began to shift 
into the hands of the Mexican cartels who were able to bring cocaine from the Andean 
regions of South America, up through Central America, and into the United States via 
Mexico. Id. 
 74. JUNE S. BEITTEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 40582, MEXICO’S DRUG-RELATED 
VIOLENCE 1 (2009). 
 75. Id. at 2. 
 76. Francisco E. González, Mexico’s Drug Wars Get Brutal, 108 CURRENT HIST. 72, 
73 (2009). 
 77. The 2000 presidential elections in Mexico marked the end of the seventy-one year 
rule of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (“PRI”), Mexico’s left leaning political par-
ty. Astorga & Shirk, supra note 71, at 34, 40. Many commentators note a significant 
amount of cooperation between the PRI and drug trafficking organizations, which was 
disrupted by President Vicente Fox’s 2000 win. BEITTEL, supra note 74, at 2–3; see also 
Astorga & Shirk, supra note 71, at 32–40 (describing the rise of Mexican drug trafficking 
organizations over the past one hundred years). 
 78. Brewer, supra note 40, at 7. 
 79. BEITTEL, supra note 74, at 3. In July 2010, drug violence in northern Mexico in-
creased in intensity when a drug trafficking organization killed numerous police and 
302 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:1 
in Mexico has risen to such a high level that it has become a significant 
threat to the security of Mexico and the United States.80 
Accordingly, in 2008, the Mexican legislature passed a series of consti-
tutional reforms that restructured the criminal justice system in order to 
target drug trafficking organizations and increase rule of law.81 These 
legislative reforms require all Mexican states to adopt a new system of 
criminal procedure, which focuses on oral/adversarial advocacy, accu-
satory principles, neutral and detached magistrates, and a more empow-
ered defense bar.82 In theory, all of the states will be required to adopt 
this new procedural system before 2016.83 
The constitutional amendments attack drug trafficking organizations 
from multiple angles. Primarily, the amendments attempt to decrease 
corruption within the criminal justice system through the implementation 
of numerous procedural safeguards and a lessening of the plenary power 
of the public prosecutor.84 Simultaneously, however, by constitutionaliz-
ing preventative detention and other questionable investigative tech-
niques, the amendments significantly restrict the rights of those accused 
of participating in organized crime.85 Thus, while the amendments in-
clude important advances towards establishing rule of law, they also con-
tain “serious setbacks for human rights, publicized by the government as 
                                                                                                             
medical workers by setting off a car bomb in Juarez, Mexico, just south of El Paso, Tex-
as. William Booth, Ciudad Juarez Car Bomb Shows New Sophistication in Mexican Drug 
Cartel’s Tactics, WASH. POST (July 22, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/07/21/AR2010072106200.html?sid=ST2010072106244. Before 
triggering the bomb with a cell phone, “the assailants drew police and medical workers to 
the scene by leaving a bound, wounded man in a police uniform near an intersection and 
then calling in a false report that an officer had been shot.” Id. 
 80. LUGAR, supra note 9, at 2–3; see also Astorga & Shirk, supra note 71, at 31; Bai-
ley, supra note 6, at 327. 
 81. Wright, supra note 5, at 363–64; C.P. (Mex.) The exact genesis of the refor-
mations is debated. Significant parallels exist that suggest rises in drug violence and or-
ganized crime created a scenario in which reformation was necessary to establish a 
stronger rule of law. See Wright, supra note 5, at 380–84. However, other possible moti-
vations exist including democratic governance, id. at 379–80, and pressure from the Unit-
ed States. See Evia, supra note 14, at 277–78; Luz E. Nagle, On Armed Conflict, Human 
Rights, and Preserving the Rule of Law in Latin America, 27 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 1, 
19–21 (2008). 
 82. C.P. art. 20 (Mex.). 
 83. Id. art. segundo transitorio [second transitional]. 
 84. See id. arts. 19–21; see also Shirk, supra note 15, at 222–23 (explaining the effect 
of the constitutional amendments). 
 85. See C.P. arts. 16, 18 (Mex.). The amendments also combat organized crime 
through the restructuring of the police force and the nation’s investigative agencies. 
Shirk, supra note 15, at 232–33. 
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necessary measures in the war on crime.”86 Aspects of these conflicting 
approaches will be discussed in turn. 
Revisions to Article 20 of the constitution provide that, “criminal pro-
ceedings shall be accusatory and oral,” thus establishing a foundation to 
decrease the power of the public prosecutor.87 Under the revised article, 
the entirety of the trial must take place in front of a judge “who is unfa-
miliar with the case . . . and the presentation of arguments and evidence 
will be open to the public, adversarial, and oral.”88 Accordingly, the pre-
sumption of credibility afforded to the prosecution’s evidence will be 
abandoned, replaced by a system more reminiscent of the United States 
where decisions on admissibility are made by a neutral and detached 
magistrate (juez de garantía).89 Further, decisions on admissibility will 
no longer take place ex parte.90 Instead, both parties will have equal op-
portunities to orally argue admissibility in front of a juez de garantía.91 
To ensure the neutrality of the judiciary, the amendments split the judi-
cial process between multiple judges. After a juez de garantía rules on 
the admissibility of evidence, the case is handed to a trial judge (juez de 
juicio oral) who is unfamiliar with the investigative phase, and thus will 
only consider the admissible evidence presented through oral arguments 
by each party.92 At the termination of the trial, the juez de juicio oral will 
decide on the guilt or innocence of the suspect, and a third judge (juez de 
ejecución de sentencia) will preside over the administration of the sen-
tence.93 With limited exceptions, all of the above proceedings “will be 
tried in an open court.”94 
If implemented, the revised Article 20 would provide numerous ad-
vantages toward combating organized crime and corruption, and thus, 
establishing rule of law. Under the current procedural regime, the public 
prosecutor and judge’s autonomy enables potential corruption of officials 
within the criminal justice system, thus leading to a system of impunity 
in which organized crime participants may circumvent the law by bribing 
                                                                                                             
 86. Brewer, supra note 40, at 10. 
 87. C.P. art. 20 (Mex.). 
 88. Id. art. 20 § A.IV. 
 89. Shirk, supra note 15, at 227. 
 90. C.P. art. 20 § A (Mex.) (“The presentation of arguments and evidence will be 
open to the public, adversarial, and oral.”). 
 91. Id. art. 20 § A.V. 
 92. Shirk, supra note 15, at 227. 
 93. Id. at 17. 
 94. C.P. art. 20 § B.V (Mex.). Exceptions include reasons of “law, national security, 
public security, protection of victims, witnesses and minors, where classified information 
will be revealed, or when the court finds other fundamental reasons to justify an excep-
tion.” Id. 
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or threatening officers of the court.95 Accordingly, by introducing more 
players into the procedural process, the revisions “offer more actors the 
power to influence the outcome at more stages of the criminal process.”96 
In particular, the introduction of multiple judges will counterbalance the 
power of each individual, and “enhance the distinction between the per-
spectives and function of the prosecutor and the judge.”97 Ideally, by 
providing a system of checks, the constitutional amendments will be ef-
fective in combating the systematic failures of the criminal justice system 
that are responsible for creating corruption and decreasing rule of law in 
Mexico.98 
Further, the framework implementing oral and public trials will help 
create transparency and legitimacy in court proceedings, therefore ensur-
ing a presumption of innocence.99 The current inquisitorial system lacks 
a presumption of innocence for the defendant, due in part to the high lev-
el of evidence required of the prosecution during the pre-instruction 
phase, as well as the abundance of pretrial detentions.100 However, by 
requiring adversarial arguments on the admissibility of evidence, and by 
limiting the use of pre-trial detention, the amendments help create a sys-
tem in which guilty until proven innocent applies.101 
                                                                                                             
 95. Injustice and Impunity, supra note 63, at 7. 
 96. Wright, supra note 5, 378. 
 97. Id. at 377. 
 98. See EDMONDS-POLI & SHIRK, supra note 58, at 314–15 (Arguing that corruption in 
Mexico “may be driven by larger, systematic factors, rather than by intrinsically held 
beliefs and value systems”; and therefore, “Mexico’s ability to combat corruption will no 
doubt depend on its ability to reduce the relative costs for those seeking to subvert the 
law, both by better compensating public officials and by increasing the probability of 
punishment for those who make or take bribes.”). 
 99. Wright, supra note 5, at 381; see also Mérida Initiative to Combat Illicit Narcotics 
and Reduce Organized Crime Authorization Act of 2008, H.R. 6028, 110th Cong. § 121 
(2008) (“It is the sense of Congress that, as a critical part of a joint, comprehensive secu-
rity, counternarcotics, and organized crime initiative, the United States should support . . . 
anti-corruption, transparency, and human rights programs to ensure due process and ex-
pand a culture of lawfulness in Mexico.”). 
 100. EDMONDS-POLI & SHIRK, supra note 58, at 308. 
 101. See Shirk, supra note 15, at 223–27. 
[M]ore than 40% of Mexico’s prison population (some 90,000 prisoners) has 
consisted of prisoners waiting in jail for a final verdict. . . . Under the new re-
forms, pre-trial detentions are intended to apply only in cases of violent or seri-
ous crimes, and for suspects who are considered a flight risk or a danger to so-
ciety. Also, the new reforms require those held in pre-trial detention to be 
housed in separate prison facilities (away from convicted criminals), . . . for a 
maximum of two years without a sentence. 
Id. 
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In conflict with the due process assurances of Article 20, Articles 16 
and 18 create a “state of exception,”102 which limits the constitutional 
rights of persons suspected of involvement with organized crime.103 Arti-
cle 16 solidifies the practice of arraigo, by explicitly making the practice 
constitutional in cases of organized crime.104 Accordingly, under the re-
vised constitution, law enforcement may detain a person suspected of 
participation in organized crime for up to eighty days when the detention 
facilitates “the success of the investigation, the protection of people or 
legal property, or when there is a founded risk that the accused will oth-
erwise escape justice.”105 The eighty-day period is significantly longer 
than the limits on preventative detention in all other Western democra-
cies.106 
Similar to Article 16, Article 18 further marginalizes organized crime 
suspects from all other criminals. The article provides that persons sus-
pected of organized crime can be placed in special detention facilities 
located far from their homes.107 Further, Article 18 authorizes “compe-
tent authorities” to restrict the communications of all persons suspected 
                                                                                                             
 102. A “state of exception” can be defined as a limitation placed on certain individu-
als’ constitutional rights in order to allow the state to combat an extraordinary emergen-
cy. Richard J. Wilson, Supporting or Thwarting the Revolution? The Inter-American 
Human Rights System and Criminal Procedure Reform in Latin America, 14 SW. J.L. & 
TRADE AM. 287, 293–94. A state of exception is generally limited to “time[s] of war, 
public danger, or other emergency that threatens the independence or security of a State.” 
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 27, Nov. 
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
 103. C.P. arts. 16, 18 (Mex.); Brewer, supra note 40, at 10. Revised Article 16 defines 
organized crime, for the purpose of the constitution, as “an organization made of three or 
more people, with the intent of committing crimes in a permanent or repetitive manner.” 
C.P. art. 16 (Mex.). 
 104. Prior to the amendments, the practice was already common among prosecutors. 
Brewer, supra note 40, at 10. 
 105. C.P. art. 16 (Mex.). 
 106. Letter from José Miguel Vivanco, Exec. Dir. Americas Div., Human Rights 
Watch, to President Felipe Calderón, Mex. (Mar. 6, 2008), available at 
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2008/03/06/mexico18221_txt.htm. 
The American Convention on Human Rights (Article 7, ACHR), the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 9, ICCPR), and the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights (Article 5, ECHR) all require that an indi-
vidual arrested or detained on reasonable suspicion of having committed an of-
fense must be “informed promptly” of the charge against him or her and 
“brought promptly” before a judge or other officer authorized by law to exer-
cise judicial power. 
Id. 
 107. C.P. art. 18 (Mex.). 
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or convicted of organized crime participation.108 It is important to note 
that the restrictions created by the article apply equally to people simply 
accused of crimes and those who have actually been found guilty. Ac-
cordingly, the two articles taken together create a criminal justice system 
that prejudicially differentiates between citizens, without taking into con-
sideration a presumption of innocence. 
While the second transitory article of the revisions requires the thirty-
one Mexican states to implement the reform by 2016, the implementation 
has been slow. Prior to the reform, six states implemented similar revi-
sions to their state constitutions, yet in practice these states have not im-
plemented any significant criminal procedure changes.109 In particular, a 
lack of public trust, funding, and political will has hindered the process 
of judicial reform among the states.110 In Chihuahua, the state that is fur-
thest along in establishing oral trials, implementation of the reform has 
been significantly hindered by drug violence.111 This violence is so in-
tense that many established lawyers and judges have either been killed or 
have fled in fear, leaving the implementation to be administered by a less 
educated and younger generation of jurists.112 In fact, the Mexican news-
paper, El Universal, reported that between 2008 and July 2010, various 
organized crime groups have been responsible for killing ninety-eight 
members of the Chihuahua State Attorney General’s Office who had re-
ceived training in the implementation of the procedural reforms.113 Ac-
cordingly, citing the public’s adverse perception of the reforms, the At-
torney General of Mexico, Arturo Chávez, stated that there have been 
failings in the states where the reforms have been initiated.114 
                                                                                                             
 108. Id. 
 109. Shirk, supra note 15, at 236. Chihuahua, Mexico State, Morelos, Oaxaca, Nuevo 
León, and Zacatecas adopted similar reforms prior to 2008, and in 2007, Chihuahua held 
its first oral trial. Id. Simultaneously, however, Aguascalientes, Baja California Sur, 
Campeche, Chiapas, Coahuila, Colima, the Federal District, Guerrero, Jalisco, Michoa-
cán, Nayarit, Puebla, Querétaro, San Luis Potosí, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas, and Vera-
cruz still had yet to initiate any significant revisions by the beginning of 2010. Id. 
 110. See Governor Express Concerns About the Viability of Justice Reforms, JUST. IN 
MEX. NEWS REP., June 2010, at 18, available at 
http://catcher.sandiego.edu/items/peacestudies/june2010.pdf. 
 111. Federal Officials Look Warily at Failings in Chihuahua Judicial Reforms, JUST. 
IN MEX. NEWS REP., Aug. 2010, at 15 [hereinafter Federal Officials], available at 
http://justiceinmexico.files.wordpress.com/2010/10/2010-08-
august_news_report_aug23_10.pdf. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Evangelina Hernández, Narcoguerra Rebasa a la Reforma Judicial, EL 
UNIVERSAL (July 19, 2010), http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/696257.html (Mex.). 
 114. Jorge Ramos Pérez, Poderes se Reclaman Reforma Penal Fallida, EL UNIVERSAL 
(Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/notas/701177.html (Mex.). 
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While the majority of states have made at least some legislative revi-
sions, implementation difficulties have been expressed throughout the 
country. Rodrigo Medina, governor of Nuevo León, recently expressed 
concern regarding the state’s inability to quickly implement any signifi-
cant reform because of economic constraints, and urged the 2011 con-
gress to allocate more funds toward implementation at the state level.115 
Additionally, Marco Adame, governor of Morelos, cited a lack of politi-
cal will and support on the part of the federal government in aiding in the 
implementation in his state.116 
III. ESTABLISHING RULE OF LAW 
Effective implementation of Article 20 is essential in increasing rule of 
law in Mexico. Without the procedural safeguards provided for by Arti-
cle 20, the limitations on suspects’ rights in Articles 16 and 18 will create 
a significant threat to rule of law in Mexico. Accordingly, in order for the 
revisions to be successful, state procedural codes will require significant 
revisions.117 The infrastructure of the court system will need to undergo 
immense changes as well. Lawyers, judges, law enforcement officers, 
and court personnel will have to be trained in oral advocacy and detailed 
rules of evidence, and courtrooms will need to be remodeled to accom-
modate public hearings.118 Most importantly, however, in order for the 
revisions to be successfully implemented, corruption must be eradicated 
from the justice system and public confidence in the courts will have to 
increase significantly.119 This change is only possible through effective 
and practical implementation of the accusatory criminal justice system as 
provided for by Article 20. 
                                                                                                             
 115. Blanca Estela Botello, Concretar Reforma de Justicia Requiere de Recursos, 
Dicen Gobernadores, LA CRONICA DE HOY (May 26, 2010), 
http://www.cronica.com.mx/nota.php?id_nota=508577 (Mex.). 
 116. Id. 
 117. Shirk, supra note 15, at 234. 
 118. Brennan, supra note 28, at 45; Shirk, supra note 15, at 234, 238–39. 
 119. Herein lies the heart of the issue. Unfortunately, this reasoning is cyclical in na-
ture in that the constitutional reforms are designed to eradicate corruption and establish 
rule of law, but are simultaneously hindered by the very issues that they are designed to 
remedy. 
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A. Rule of Law 
Rule of law is a somewhat ambiguous concept, which has been defined 
and redefined on countless occasions.120 The Secretary-General of the 
United Nations described rule of law as: 
[A] principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and enti-
ties, public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to 
laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights 
norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to endure adherence 
to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, account-
ability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, separation of 
powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of 
arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.121 
In its essence, rule of law can be separated into three essential ele-
ments: 
First, the power of the State may not be exercised arbitrarily. This in-
corporates the rejection of “rule of man,” but does not require that the 
State power be exercised for any particular purpose. It does, however, 
require that laws be prospective, accessible, and clear. 
Secondly, the law must apply also to the sovereign and instruments of 
the State, with an independent institution such as a judiciary to apply 
the law to specific cases. . . . 
Thirdly, the law must apply to all persons equally, offering equal pro-
tection without prejudicial discrimination. The law should be of general 
application and consistent implementation; it should be capable of be-
ing obeyed. This presumes that the rule of law is more than simply 
“law in the books” and that these principles also apply to “law in ac-
tion.”122 
                                                                                                             
 120. For a discussion of the different approaches to defining the rule of law in a Latin 
American context, see Nagle, supra note 81, at 3–19; see also David Tolbert & Andrew 
Solomon, United Nations Reform and Supporting the Rule of Law in Post-Conflict Socie-
ties, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 29, 30–33 (2006); Tonya L. Jankunis, Military Strategists are 
from Mars, Rule of Law Theorists are from Venus: Why Imposition of the Rule of Law 
Requires a Goldwater-Nichols Modeled Interagency Reform, 197 MIL. L. REV. 16, 29–60 
(2008). 
 121. U.N. S.C., The Rule of Law and Transnational Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies: Rep. of the Security-General, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 
2004). 
 122. Simon Chesterman, An International Rule of Law?, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 331, 342 
(2008). 
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Thus, an effective legal system comprised of an independent and neu-
tral judiciary and a well-trained bar, who can work in concert to uniform-
ly enforce the law while simultaneously respecting individual liberties is 
essential to rule of law.123 
Rule of law is frequently evoked by NGOs and international agencies 
during the rebuilding of post-conflict societies.124 Drug violence in Mex-
ico is by no means equal to the violence in most post-conflict areas; 
however, the insurgent nature of the cartels presents circumstances best 
analyzed through a post-conflict lens.125 While a strong justice system in 
Mexico is required to establish rule of law and thereby lower crime rates, 
the extreme violence that currently exists is preventing the justice system 
from working effectively.126 Further, without an effective justice system, 
law enforcement is left with little option but to fight crime in an extraju-
dicial manner that often disregards due process and human rights. Thus, 
in confronting organized crime groups, Mexico “face[s] a difficult chal-
lenge in balancing respect for human rights while [simultaneously] con-
ducting security operations.”127 Even still, to establish an effective legal 
system capable of permanently quelling violence in the future, Mexico 
“must adhere to the primacy of the rule of law and respect for human 
rights over military and security objectives.”128 
Even prior to the rise in organized crime, Mexico lacked a judicial sys-
tem capable of establishing rule of law.129 “[L]egal proceedings in Mexi-
co have, traditionally, been characterized by inefficiency, uncertainty, 
and the perception that the ‘contravention of the law is the daily rule ra-
                                                                                                             
 123. Nagle, supra note 81, at 16. 
 124. See Tolbert & Solomon, supra note 120, at 30–33 (discussing the United Nations’ 
role in rebuilding post-conflict states through the implementation of rule of law). 
 125. See id. at 30 (“One should be careful not to create a false dichotomy between 
traditional rule of law development work and efforts to build the rule of law in post-
conflict societies. In fact, many of the strategies employed in the former are also relevant 
in the latter.”). In September 2010, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton warned that the drug 
trafficking organizations in Mexico were “morphing into . . . what we would consider an 
insurgency.” A Night to Remember, and to Forget: A Double Anniversary Amid a Na-
tional Funk, ECONOMIST (Sept. 16, 2010), 
http://www.economist.com/node/17043739?fsrc=scn%2Ftw%2Fte%2 
Frss%2Fpe&story_id=17043739. While President Obama quickly rebuffed Clinton’s 
analogy, id., significant parallels can be drawn between insurgencies and the terror induc-
ing tactics of the drug cartels, which include car bombings, kidnappings, and political 
assassinations. 
 126. Federal Officials, supra note 111, at 18. 
 127. Nagle, supra note 81, at 33–34. 
 128. Id. at 34. 
 129. See Robert Kossick, The Rule of Law and Development in Mexico, 21 ARIZ. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 715, 715–17 (2004). 
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ther than the exception.’”130 Interestingly, however, from a formalistic 
perspective Mexico’s comprehensive legislation and codes provide the 
requisites necessary for establishing rule of law.131 Similarly, corruption 
aside, Mexico’s legislative systems are well structured and capable of 
effectively passing democratic legislation and reform, as evidenced by 
the recent amendments.132 However, the ambiguity and uncertain method 
in which Mexico’s laws are enforced threatens the fundamental aspects 
of due process, and thereby decreases public confidence in the justice 
system, thus impairing rule of law.133 
Recently, some signs of improvement of rule of law have been seen in 
Baja California, particularly in Tijuana where decreases in violent crimes 
have been reported.134 Baja California was one of the first states to im-
plement reform when it passed similar legislation to the 2008 amend-
ments in October 2007.135 Currently, oral trials are taking place in the 
Mexicali judicial district and there are plans to begin trials in the other 
four districts sometime next year.136 The question, however, is whether 
the judicial reform was responsible for the decrease in crime.137 Instead 
of judicial reform, many sources attribute the decrease in crime to ex-
treme police tactics that have repeatedly been accused of human rights 
violations and torture.138 Finally, while severe episodes of violence in 
                                                                                                             
 130. Id. at 715 (quoting Alberto Szekely, Democracy, Judicial Reform, The Rule of 
Law, and Environmental Justice in Mexico, 21 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 385, 388 (1999)). 
 131. See Nagle, supra note 81, at 11. 
 132. This is in contrast with the traditional post-conflict society in which a legislative 
system must first be established in order to effectively create a rule of law. See Tolbert & 
Solomon, supra note 120, at 41–44. Accordingly, Mexico is at an advantage in that it 
already has the foundation upon which an effective legal system can be built. 
 133. This ambiguous application of the law is precisely the distinction between the 
“law in the books” and the “law in action” discussed in Professor Chesterman’s third 
category. Chesterman, supra note 122, at 342. 
 134. Randal C. Archibold, Marijuana Bonfire Celebrates a Fragile Calm, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 22, 2010 at A8 [hereinafter Bonfire]. 
 135. David Shirk, Mexicali Lawyers Begin Oral Advocacy Training Program, JUST. IN 
MEXICO PROJECT (Sept. 10, 2010), http://justiceinmexico.org/2010/09/10/mexicali-
lawyers-begin-oral-advocacy-training-program. 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Bonfire, supra note 134 (suggesting that the decrease could be the result of 
unlawful policing tactics); William Finnegan, In the Name of the Law: A Colonel Cracks 
Down on Corruption, NEW YORKER (Oct. 18, 2010), 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/10/18/101018fa_fact_finnegan [hereinafter 
Colonel] (same). 
 138. Colonel, supra note 137 (attributing Tijuana’s decrease in crime to its police chief 
Colonel Julián Leyzaola Pérez, whose tactics were so extreme that once, after “[a]riving 
at the scene of a shoot-out where one of his men had died, . . . he punched the corpse of a 
cartel gunman in the face.”). 
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Tijuana have been less frequent in the past two years, mass killings and 
shootouts are reemerging. Recently, in response to police seizing 135 
tons of marijuana, drug traffickers killed thirteen people in a Tijuana 
drug rehab center.139 Following the killings, the cartel members broad-
casted messages over police radios threatening 135 more killings—a life 
for each ton seized.140 These recent events suggest that violence has not 
actually decreased at all, but rather has been forced to the periphery of 
the public eye.141 
The current events in Tijuana highlight the lack of rule of law in north-
ern Mexico. While police and military forces are able to arrest or kill 
cartel leaders and establish temporary peace, without an independent and 
functional legal system, long-term peace cannot be achieved. In other 
words, without a legal system that is equally apt at policing public and 
government behavior, little exists to deter future corruption and prevent 
violence. The 2008 constitutional amendments provide a foundation for 
establishing a more robust rule of law, however, a delicate balance will 
be required between the efficient implementation of the amendments, 
and an effective means of combating organized crime violence. Unless 
the procedural safeguards provided by Article 20 are effectively imple-
mented, escalating violence, extrajudicial police activities, and a de-
crease of individual rights will further decrease public confidence in the 
justice system, thereby threatening the rule of law. Accordingly, in order 
for the 2008 constitutional amendments to have a positive effect on rule 
of law, the implementation must be effective in modifying the legal insti-
tutions responsible for enforcing the law: the judiciary and the bar.142 
B. Putting the Amendments into Practice 
David Tolbert and Andrew Solomon discuss the importance of estab-
lishing an independent and respected legal profession: 
An independent legal profession comprised of a cadre of well-trained 
and ethical lawyers can ensure due process and protect fundamental 
rights by pursuing the necessary remedies when these rights have been 
infringed upon. Thus, lawyers can facilitate the public’s confidence in 
the fairness and efficacy of the legal system, which is essential not only 
to the formal and institutional development of the rule of law, but also 
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to instilling the values that make up the informal aspects of the rule of 
law in a democratic society. 
. . . 
[However], [l]awyers in many post-conflict societies, as well as those 
in former authoritarian countries, must first overcome structural imped-
iments to the independence of their profession, including the existence 
of legislative frameworks that relegate the profession to a subservient 
position in a legal hierarchy dominated by the state prosecutor.143 
By establishing an adversarial criminal justice system, the 2008 consti-
tutional amendments create a framework to significantly improve the 
role and prestige of lawyers in Mexico, particularly the defense bar. By 
decreasing the power of the public prosecutor and allowing for adversar-
ial presentation of arguments, defense lawyers will no longer occupy “a 
subservient position” in the criminal justice system. However, legal edu-
cation is imperative to properly achieve a well-balanced and efficient 
bar. This is because adversarial justice systems depend “on relatively 
equal skill and resources between the parties, making the role and com-
petence of defense counsel of cardinal importance.”144 Thus, while the 
amendments allow for a system in which defense lawyers play a more 
significant role, the implementation of the revisions will be dependent on 
the existence of well-trained lawyers with experience in adversarial pro-
cedures. 
Accomplishing this goal, however, may prove to be difficult. The cur-
rent state of Mexican legal education is disjointed and unorganized, due 
to a lack of oversight and licensing requirements,145 and “[t]his total want 
of organization of legal education and qualification for practice, and the 
lack of organization of the profession, without any disciplinary proce-
dures to ensure accountability, may have been the cause of the many ills 
in the administration of justice in Mexico over the years.”146 Thus, for the 
implementation of the reform to be successful, a parallel reform of the 
Mexican legal education system is also required. This necessity is well 
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recognized on national and international levels,147 however, the task is 
significant and may take time. 
In addition to the legal profession, “[a]n independent judiciary is a cen-
tral pillar of the rule of law and in many ways a guarantor of the funda-
mental human rights of individuals and groups.”148 Accordingly, in order 
to successfully bring about rule of law in Mexico, the amendments must 
establish an independent judiciary that is free from influence from both 
the executive branch and organized crime groups.149 This, however, will 
not be simple. The Mexican judiciary has a long history of influence 
from the executive branch, particularly during the seventy-year rule of 
the PRI.150 Additionally, even before the rise in organized crime vio-
lence, drug trafficking groups often physically threatened Mexico’s judi-
ciary.151 Currently, the lack of transparency and public oversight of crim-
inal proceedings provide an easy forum for these coercive influences to 
effect the judicial process.152 Ideally, by decreasing the power of individ-
ual judges and creating a more transparent system through oral trials, the 
amendments will significantly decrease opportunities for such influence 
to be asserted. 
In particular, the amendments have the potential to reduce corruption 
in the judiciary by establishing a system that will review and monitor 
judicial activity. Within the judiciary, the creation of three separate judg-
es,153 which will preside over different aspects of an individual trial, will 
introduce additional actors into the system, thereby decreasing organized 
crime’s ability to assert influence over the trial through the corruption of 
an individual judge.154 Additionally, by requiring court proceedings to be 
oral and public, the actions of individual judges will be placed under 
greater public scrutiny, which will not only ensure against misconduct, 
but will also increase public confidence in judicial decisions.155 Howev-
er, this judicial independence will only be achieved through substantial 
efforts to properly train all aspects of the criminal justice system in ad-
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versary procedure.156 Further, steps must be taken to secure the safety of 
judges and their families, so as to decrease the ability of organized crime 
to influence judicial will through physical violence and intimidation. 
While an ideal implementation of the 2008 constitutional amendments 
would constitute a step toward improving the rule of law in Mexico, the 
amendments concurrently pose a significant danger of decreasing due 
process rights of persons suspected of participation in organized crime. 
Articles 16 and 18 of the amendments create significant limitations on 
the due process rights of organized crime suspects by making arraigo 
procedures explicitly constitutional,157 and by limiting a suspect’s ability 
to communicate with the outside world.158 These threats to due process 
rights will substantially hinder efforts toward establishing rule of law in 
three ways. 
First, Articles 16 and 18 establish a system in which suspects are di-
vided into two separate classes with differing due process rights.159 
Compared to ordinary criminals, those suspected of participation in or-
ganized crime will receive significantly diminished due process guaran-
ties, thus creating dueling criminal justice systems that operate independ-
ent of each other.160 These dueling systems will violate one of the fun-
damental principles of rule of law, as described by Professor Chester-
man, which requires a consistent implementation of the law free of prej-
udice and discrimination.161 Without consistent implementation of the 
law, the public will be unable to determine legal norms with certainty, 
thereby stirring distrust in the criminal justice system and causing socie-
tal chaos.162 
Second, while it may still be too early to tell whether the implementa-
tion of an accusatorial system under Article 20 will be successful, recent 
events suggest that the process is compromised by a lack of political will, 
continuing drug violence, and an unorganized legal education system.163 
Meanwhile, however, there is nothing restricting the implementation of 
Articles 16 and 18. The system of arraigo already existed prior to the 
constitutional amendments, and has been in common use by prosecutors 
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for a number of years.164 Further, the restrictions on due process provided 
by Article 18 will be equally simple in implementation, particularly con-
sidering the already prevalent questionable methods of law enforcement 
already in practice.165 
Finally, by allowing the public prosecutor to bypass the safeguards of 
due process and judicial proceedings, Articles 16 and 18 will continue to 
perpetuate the expansive power of the public prosecutor. In doing so, the 
articles will threaten rule of law by enforcing the judiciary and the de-
fense bar’s subservient position to the executive branch.166 By maintain-
ing power within a single individual, these articles will allow for the 
same corrupt and violent influences that have plagued the Mexican crim-
inal justice system for years. Accordingly, without significant steps taken 
toward efficient and successful implementation of an accusatory justice 
system, the 2008 constitutional amendments threaten to increase human 
rights violations, while creating a disjointed and uncertain criminal jus-
tice system lacking rule of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The 2008 amendments to the Mexican Constitution provide a frame-
work for establishing an accusatorial justice system. Successful imple-
mentation of a transparent and efficient accusatorial system could signif-
icantly increase rule of law in Mexico at a moment in time when orga-
nized crime and drug violence runs rampant. However, over the past two 
years the implementation of the accusatorial system has been slow going. 
Meanwhile, additional constitutional amendments have created a system 
in which the due process rights of certain individuals are restricted by the 
actions of the public prosecutor, who continues to occupy a position of 
considerable discretion. Accordingly, it is imperative that sizeable steps 
are taken, both by the federal government of Mexico and the internation-
al community, to heighten rule of law by effectively implementing the 
revisions provided in Article 20. 
Recently, the United States has recognized the need to heighten rule of 
law in Mexico through supporting the implementation of the constitu-
tional amendments. In particular, Congress has noted that as a matter of 
joint national security interests between the United States and Mexico, 
the United States must support: “(1) programs of . . . United States agen-
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cies focused on strengthening civilian institutions and rule of law pro-
grams in Mexico at the federal, state, and local levels; and (2) anti-
corruption, transparency, and human rights programs to ensure due pro-
cess and expand a culture of lawfulness in Mexico.”167 Through funding 
from the Central American focused Mérida Initiative,168 the United States 
provided Mexico with millions of dollars to train prosecutors and inves-
tigators in trial advocacy skills.169 This funding was expanded in July 
2010, when President Obama appropriated an additional $175,000,000 
for judicial reform, institution building, anti-corruption and rule of law 
activities in Mexico.170 While this immense amount of funding is certain-
ly a start in aiding the establishment of rule of law in Mexico, it will be 
imperative in the upcoming years to continue to focus on aiding Mexico 
in its implementation of the adversarial procedures provided for in the 
2008 constitutional amendments. 
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